

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 2087

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS MPOL NATO
SUBJ: WINTEX 77 CRITIQUE YUSNATO 1704 DTG 250926Z MAR 77

SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE SETS FORTH USNATO'S VIEW OF ACTIVE
NATO HQS PLAY DURING EXERCISE WINTEX 77. AMONG THE MOST
SIGNIFICANT SHORTCOMINGS NOTED IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCED-
URES WERE: (1) THE PROBLEMS SURROUNDING DECLARATION OF
GENERAL ALERT AND DESIGNATION OF HOSTILE COUNTRIES, (2) THE
NEED TO STREAMLINE THE PROCEDURES FOR AUTHORIZING SPECIFIC
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, AND (3) THE FAILURE OF THE DPC TO
CONSIDER THE PUBLIC INFORMATION ASPECTS OF ITS ACTIONS AND
THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT THE OTHER SIDE IS CONVINCED, EARLY
IN ANY CRISIS SITUATION, OF NATO'S DETERMINATION TO RESIST
HOSTILE ACTS. ANOTHER MAJOR SHORTCOMING, INTERNAL TO US
PLAY, WAS THE EXTREMELY POOR QUALITY OF THE SECURE VOICE
COMMUNICATION (AUTOSEVCOM) LINK BETWEEN USNATO AND WASHINGTON.
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THE COUNCIL OPERATIONS AND EXERCISES COMMITTEE (COEC) IS
PREPARING A DRAFT COVERING LESSON LEARNED FROM WINTEX 77
WHICH WE WILL FORWARD TO WASHINGTON ON RECEIPT. ACTION
REQUESTED: WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON THE VIEWS EXPRESSED
HEREIN FOR USE IN DRAFTING THE EXERCISE REPORT. END
SUMMARY.

1. CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES
A. DECLARATION OF GENERAL ALERT (DGA) AND DESIGNATION
OF HOSTILE COUNTRIES (DHC). TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, THIS PARTICULAR

STAGE OF THE ALERT SYSTEM HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN PLAYED BY THE DPC ITSELF BUT ONLY BY A DPC RESPONSE CELL. THIS APPARENTLY HAS RESULTED IN AN UNREALISTICALLY OPTIMISTIC IMPRESSION AS TO HOW LONG THESE PROCEDURES, AS CURRENTLY ESTABLISHED, WILL TAKE. IN WINTEX 77, THERE WAS A TENDENCY FOR PLAYERS TO SKIP OVER THE COMPLICATED PROCEDURES AND WEIGHTY DECISIONS INVOLVED IN GETTING 15 NATIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY TO GO TO WAR, OR TO REGARD THE DGH/DHN PROCESS AS A MERE FORMALITY. WE BELIEVE THIS APPROACH IGNORES PROBLEMS NATO

COMMANDERS POSSIBLY MIGHT FACE BETWEEN THE ONSET OF HOSTILITIES AND DGA/DHN, E.G., INITIAL EMPLOYMENT OF OFFENSIVE AIR SORTIES, ETC.

AS A RESULT OF WINTEX 77, SEVERAL DELEGATIONS HAVE INDICATED THAT THE DGA/DHN PROCESS MAY NEED CLARIFICATION AND REFINEMENT. WE HAVE WRITTEN THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO SUGGEST THAT, AS AN INITIAL STEP, HE MIGHT WISH TO TASK THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO DEFINE THE HANDICAPS MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS WOULD FACE BETWEEN THE ONSET OF HOSTILITIES AND DGA/DHN. ONCE THE PROBLEM IS CLEARLY SET FORTH, THE DPC COULD THEN BEGIN TO ANALYZE IT AND CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES TO MEET IT.

B. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE). DPC CONSIDERATION OF MNC REQUESTS FOR CHANGES IN ROE WAS COMPLICATED AND CONFUSING. THE DELAYS IN GRANTING SUCH REQUESTS COULD HAVE HAD SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES IN AN ACTUAL CRISIS. WE UNDERSTAND THE THREE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS (MNC) ARE DEVELOPING A REVISED SYSTEM OF MARITIME ROE IN WHICH ONLY POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT

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OR ESCALATORY RULES WOULD REQUIRE DPC CONSIDERATION AND APPROVAL. IF APPROVED, THIS WILL BE A MAJOR STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. IT MIGHT ALSO BE ADVISABLE TO CONSIDER ESTABLISHMENT OF A "ROE COMMITTEE" (SIMILAR TO THE ALERTS COMMITTEE) THAT WOULD WORK BY EXCEPTION.

C. PUBLIC INFORMATION ASPECTS. AS IN PAST EXERCISED, WE DO NOT THINK ENOUGH ATTENTION WAS GIVEN TO THE PUBLIC INFORMATION ASPECTS OF WINTEX 77. THIS IS NOT JUST A PROBLEM OF INFORMING WESTERN PUBLICS, BUT ALSO THE MORE URGENT REQUIREMENT FOR NATO TO COMMUNICATE ITS INTENTIONS TO THE OTHER SIDE EARLY IN ANY CRISIS. IF THIS FAILURE TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE LEVERAGE AFFORDED BY PUBLIC INFORMATION CHANNELS IS SOLELY A RESULT OF EXERCISE LIMITATIONS, IT DOES NOT MATTER; HOWEVER, IT RECURS SO OFTEN THAT WE SUSPECT THIS IS A POLICY AREA THAT NEEDS TO BE CAREFULLY ANALYZED.

D. DISTRIBUTION AND TRANSMISSION OF MNC MESSAGES.

IN A NUMBER OF CASES, MESSAGES FROM MNC'S WERE NOT TRANSMITTED SIMULTANEOUSLY TO CAPITALS, INCLUDING MANY OF THE REFERENCES FOR THE FIRST DPC MEETING ON MARCH 8, 1977. THIS FAILURE COMPLICATED THE GUIDANCE PROCESS. THE TIME REQUIRED TO TRANSMIT KEY MNC MESSAGES WAS ALSO SEEMINGLY EXCESSIVE; FOR EXAMPLE, IT REQUIRED MORE THAN AN HOUR FOR SACLANT'S REQUEST FOR DECLARATION OF GENERAL ALERT TO ARRIVE AT DELEGATIONS AT NATO HQS, VERSUS THIRTY MINUTES FOR SACEUR'S REQUEST.

SACEUR'S INITIAL REQUEST FOR NUCLEAR RELEASE ALSO TOOK OVER THREE HOURS TO REACH DELEGATIONS AT NATO HQS.

E. DPC AGENDAS. AGENDAS FOR THE DPC MEETINGS GENERALLY DID NOT ADEQUATELY DEFINE THE ISSUES FOR DECISION. EACH AGENDA ITEM WAS DELINEATED ONLY BY A SHORT, GENERAL TITLE AND A SERIES OF MESSAGE REFERENCES, WITH THE INFERENCE THAT ALL ISSUES IN EACH MESSAGE WERE ITEMS FOR DPC DISCUSSION

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AND DECISION. WE INTEND TO MAKE THE POINT THAT DPC AGENDAS MUST DEFINE THE ISSUES FOR DECISION MORE EXPLICITLY.

F. MC-DPC MEETING CYCLE. COMMON PRACTICE AT NATO HQS IS FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO MEET BEFORE THE DPC, USUALLY TO CONSIDER SIMILAR AGENDA ITEMS, IN ORDER THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE CAN PROVIDE THE DPC WITH "COLLECTIVE MILITARY ADVICE." UNFORTUNATELY, THE RESULT IS A TIME-CONSUMING, LARGE REDUNDANT SEQUENCE (OFTEN FOUR HOURS OR MORE ARE REQUIRED TO COMPLETE A SINGLE ITERATION). WE DOUBT WE COULD AFFORD SUCH USE OF TIME IN ANY REAL CRISIS. WHILE "JOINT" MEETINGS ARE RULED OUT BECAUSE (1) THE DPC CANNOT TECHNICALLY MEET IN JOINT SESSION WITH A SUBORDINATE COMMITTEE AND (2) IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO DEVELOP COLLECTIVE MILITARY ADVISE IN THE MIDST OF A DPC MEETING, WE BELIEVE SOME ACCOMMODATION MUST BE FOUND.

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2. EXERCISES ARRANGEMENTS/SCENARIO

A. PERMREP PLAY/DECLARATION OF GENERAL ALERT. A NATURAL TENSION ALWAYS EXISTS IN THE WINTEX EXERCISE SERIES, AS IT WOULD IN ANY REAL CRISIS SITUATION, BETWEEN THE POLITICAL AUTHORITIES WHO HAVE TO WEIGH THE CONSEQUENCES OF AUTHORIZING CERTAIN ACTIONS PRIOR TO GRANTING APPROVAL, AND THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES WHO MUST MAKE PREPARATIONS TO DEAL WITH THE CRISIS. THIS TENSION WAS UNDULY EMPHASIZED IN WINTEX 77 WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE REQUESTS FOR DGA WERE GOING TO BE FORWARDED AFTER THE PERMREPS HAD ENDED PLAY. THE PROCEDURAL IMPROVISATIONS WHICH FOLLOWED (SEE REFTEL) WERE HIGHLY UNSATISFACTORY, NOT ONLY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF LESSONS LEARNED, BUT ALSO IN THAT THE PERMREPS PLAYED ONLY A RELATIVELY INSIGNIFICANT PHASE OF THE EXERCISE. HAD PERMREP PLAY BEEN SYNCHRONIZED WITH THESE REQUESTS (AS WE ASSUMED IT WOULD BE), WE BELIEVE THE PERMREPS WOULD HAVE RECEIVED A MORE POSITIVE IMPRESSION OF THE EXERCISE THAN IS THE CASE.

B. PREPONDERANCE OF MILITARY OVER POLITICAL PLAY. THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN MILITARY AND POLITICAL PLAY IN WINTEX 77--UNLIKE HILEX 7--CANNOT BE BLAMED ENTIRELY ON THE SCENARIO. A MAJOR FACTOR WAS THAT THE DPC'S KEY SUBORDINATE COMMITTEES, E.G., THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COMMITTEES, THE ALERTS COMMITTEE, ETC., DID NOT PLAY. IF THE DPC IS TO PLAY EFFECTIVELY, IT MUST BE ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED.

C. EXERCISE PLAY OF SENSITIVE ISSUES. A NUMBER OF SENSITIVE ISSUES WERE INTERJECTED INTO THE EXERCISES BY DIRECTING STAFF AND PLAYERS ALIKE, E.G., INVASIONS OF YUGOSLAVIA AND FINLAND, EARLY EVACUATION OF US NATIONALS, AND A SEMI-ESTABLISHMENT OF US-ORANGE HOMELANDS AS "DE FACTO SAFE HAVENS" (CLEAR IN THE US RELUCTANCE TO DECLARE WAR AFTER ORANGE'S ATTACK), ETC. IN THIS REGARD, WE TEND TO AGREE WITH THE COMMENTS OF THE NETHERLANDS COEC REP (SEE FEFTEL) THAT NATIONS ARE UNLIKELY TO REVEAL SUBSTANTIVE THINKING ON SENSITIVE ISSUES IN AN EXERCISE

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SETTING FOR FEAR THAT SIGNIFICANT REAL-WORLD DAMAGE MIGHT RESULT.

D. REINFORCEMENT. BOTH WARSAW PACT AND NATO (US) TROOP DEPLOYMENTS WERE MORE RAPID THAN MIGHT BE EXPECTED IN A REAL SITUATION INVOLVING SIMILAR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. NATO, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD CONSIDERABLY MORE COMBAT MANPOWER DEPLOYED AND IN PLACE THAN COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED AT A SIMILAR STAGE IN A REAL CRISIS.

E. CHEMICAL WARFARE. THE SPORADIC, AS OPPOSED TO CONCENTRATED AND COORDINATED, USE OF CW SEEMED HIGHLY UNREALISTIC AND PRIMARILY INTENDED TO RAISE THE CW-NUCLEAR RESPONSE NEXUS ONCE AGAIN.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

A. ORANGE RESPONSE CELL. ANY PRE-SET SCENARIO, SUCH

AS THAT EMPLOYED IN WINTEX 77, PREVENTS AD HOC ORANGE REACTIONS TO NATO INITIATIVES, THUS DEPRIVING THE DPC OF REALISTIC FEEDBACK ON ITS DECISIONS. THIS HAD AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON DPC PLAY. WE BELIEVE THAT AN ORANGE RESPONSE CELL SHOULD BE CREATED TO BEGIN ACTIVE PLAY AT THE SAME TIME THE DPC DOES. THIS NEED BE NEITHER A LARGE NOR ELABORATE CELL BUT MIGHT CONSIST OF ONLY A FEW PERSONNEL QUALIFIED TO VIEW NATO (DPC) AND NATIONAL INITIATIVES IN TERMS OF ESTABLISHED ORANGE GOALS, AND PROVIDE FEEDBACK WITHIN THE GENERAL LIMITS SET BY THE OVERALL SCENARIO.

B. INTERNAL SECURITY. THIS SUBJECT RECEIVED VERY LITTLE ATTENTION BY THE MC OR DPC IN WINTEX 77. WHILE THIS, IN PART, MIGHT BE BECAUSE THE SCEPC DID NOT PLAY ACTIVELY (IT MET ONLY ONCE); WE WONDER, HOWEVER, WHETHER SUCH A SERIOUS MATTER, AFFECTING AS IT DOES THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH MILITARY COMMANDERS WILL HAVE TO OPERATE, CAN BE LEFT STRICTLY TO A SUBORDINATE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE.

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IT SEEMS TO US THERE SHOULD BE MORE MILITARY CONCERN WITH PLANNING, AND MORE EXERCISE PLAY IN THIS AREA.
C. LOGISTICS/SUPPLY PLAY. LOGISTICS PROBLEMS WERE NOT HIGHLIGHTED FOR THE ATTENTION OF THE DPC, EVEN THOUGH THE SHORTAGE OF CERTAIN CRITICAL WEAPONS WAS ONE ELEMENT IN SACEUR'S JUSTIFICATION FOR USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE THINK WE MISSED AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE LOGISTICS PROBLEMS THAT ARE LIKELY TO ARISE FROM NATO'S FAILURE TO STANDARDIZE AND RATIONALIZE.

4. INTERNAL PROBLEMS CONCERNING USNATO/WASHINGTON
PLAY

A. INADEQUACY OF SECURE VOICE EQUIPMENT. WINTEX 77
CONFIRMED AGAIN THAT EXTENSIVE USE OF VOICE COMMUNICATIONS
SYSTEMS WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO PASS INFORMATION AND RECEIVE
GUIDANCE IN TIME TO MEET OPERATIONAL DEADLINES, WHETHER IN
AN EXERCISE OR A REAL CRISIS. HOWEVER, THE POOR QUALITY OF
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THE SECURE VOICE SYSTEM LINKING WASHINGTON AND USNATO
DURING WINTEX 77 RAISES SERIOUS DOUBT AS TO ITS USEFULNESS.
WE UNDERSTAND THAT WIDEBAND SECURE VOICE WOULD OVERCOME THIS
PROBLEM, AND BY SEPTEL WE WILL REQUEST ITS PROVISION TO USNATO.

B. DPC RESPONSE CELL. DESPITE NUMEROUS MESSAGES
EXPLAINING THAT ONLY A DPC RESPONSE CELL WOULD BE PLAYING
FROM MARCH 1-7, THE WASHINGTON RESPONSE GROUP SEVERAL TIMES
TASKED US TO CONTACT SELECTED DELEGATIONS OR THE DPC TO
INFORM OR ASK THEIR OPINIONS. SINCE THE DPC AND NATIONAL
DELEGATIONS WERE NOT ACTUALLY PLAYING DURING THIS PERIOD,
WE COULD NOT READILY ACCOMPLISH THESE TASKS; OUR INABILITY
TO MAKE THE REQUESTED DEMARCHE SUBSEQUENTLY RESULTED IN
ADDITIONAL ARTIFICIALITIES LATER IN THE PLAY. STRAUSZ-HUPE

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